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THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
A MERE SUPERFLUOUS NUANCE OR A VITAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE DOCTRINE? AN ANALYSIS OF THE TENTH
CIRCUIT' S DECISION IN JOHNSON V. RODRIGUES
INTRODUCTION
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine ("Rooker-Feldman") has been, and
continues to be, a tremendous source of confusion for courts and attor-
neys alike. Rooker-Feldman is often misapplied as an abstention or pre-
clusion doctrine and courts exacerbate the problem by continually using
the three doctrines interchangeably. One source of this confusion is that
the United States Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") has not provided the
Circuit Courts direction about how to apply the doctrine. In fact, the
"Supreme Court has not held a case barred by Rooker-Feldman since
1983. "1 Therefore, there is little guidance on how to properly apply the
doctrine and many federal courts have written confusing and contradic-
tory opinions as a result. Although the application of Rooker-Feldman
use has been problematic, courts us it frequently. In fact, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has already addressed four Rooker-Feldman cases in the year 2001.2
This alone makes Rooker-Feldman an important civil procedure tool and
one that must be clearly understood. In order to clarify the use of
Rooker-Feldman, this article focuses on the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Johnson v. Rodrigues.3 In this case, the Tenth Circuit not only properly
applied Rooker-Feldman, but signaled the likely manner in which many
courts will utilize the doctrine in the future.
Part I will explain the origin and foundation of Rooker-Feldman,
how Rooker-Feldman relates to abstention and preclusion theories, the
controversy surrounding the doctrine including why some commentators
think Rooker-Feldman should be overturned and abandoned, and how the
Tenth Circuit has applied Rooker-Feldman in past decisions. Part II will
discuss the scope of Rooker-Feldman in today's courts, focusing on the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Johnston v. Rodrigues and the positions taken
by other Circuit Courts. Finally, Part III will provide an analysis of what
1. Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in
Action, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1085 (1999).
2. See Mehdipour v. Chapel, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2680 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2001);
Continental Cas. Co. v. Hempel, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2757 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2001); Bisbee v.
McCarty, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1512 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2001); Read v. Klein, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 334 (10th Cir. Jan. 9, 2001).
3. 226 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2000).
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place the doctrine has in civil procedure and how the Tenth Circuit used
the doctrine for its intended purpose in Johnston v. Rodrigues.4
I. BACKGROUND
There are three major legal doctrines or theories to keep a claim that
has previously been litigated from being re-litigated. Those doctrines are
abstention theories, preclusion theories, and Rooker-Feldman. While
abstention and preclusion theories are familiar to courts and to litigation
attorneys, Rooker-Feldman has been and continues to be confusing and
troublesome. Rooker-Feldman appears to be, on the one hand "superflu-
ous" 5 and on the other, "extremely significant., 6 In order to understand
the application of Rooker-Feldman and where the doctrine may have a
purpose in the legal system, one must understand the doctrine itself, and
more importantly, how it fits with abstention and preclusion theories.
A. Rooker-Feldman: A Doctrine Grounded in Jurisdiction Theories
Rooker-Feldman, in its most simple terms, limits lower federal
court's jurisdiction as an "appellate" court to cases that originated in the
state courts. 7 Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine grounded in jurisdiction theo-
ries.8 It is based on statutes passed by Congress that give appellate juris-
diction to the United States Supreme Court.9 The Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to hear "final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had. . . ."'0 This statute not
only gives the Supreme Court jurisdictional rights, but it also denies the
lower federal courts the ability to hear cases that arise in state courts."
Furthermore, Congress has enacted statutes that grant lower federal
12courts jurisdiction in other kinds of cases. Since Congress has specified
when the lower federal courts have jurisdiction, one may conclude that
lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction over cases originating in
4. Johnston, 226 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2000).
5. See Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, From the Ground Up, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129 (1999).
6. Id.
7. Edmonds v. Clarkson, 996 F. Supp. 541, 546 (E.D. Va. 1998).
8. See 18 C. WRIGHT, et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469 (1981 &
Supp. 2000) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER], David P. Currie, Res Judicata; The
Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 322 (1978); Gary Thompson, The Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts, 42 RUTGERS L. REV.
859, 912 (1990).
9. Thompson, supra note 8, at 860.
10. 28 U.S.C. §1257 (2000).
11. Id.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in




state court.1 3 The Supreme Court noted in its 1988 term, "The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine interprets 28 U.S.C. § 1257 as ordinarily barring direct
review in the lower federal courts of a decision reached by the highest
state court, for such authority is vested solely in this Court.'14 If allowed,
".. . [t]he effect of such a jurisdiction would be to displace almost the
whole of state litigation into federal courts by making the final judgment
in the state court the cause of action that kicks off a suit to undo that
judgment in federal courts."' 5
This statutory construction leads to the most favored policy reason
for Rooker-Feldman-"facilitat[ing] a state appellate process free from
federal interference."' 16 Rooker-Feldman restricts a litigant from access-
ing the lower federal courts, therefore, allowing the state courts to rule
free from federal intervention. Therefore, "once the highest state court
has taken some form of action, only the Supreme Court may hear an ap-
peal. '
1. The Rooker Decision
Rooker-Feldman originated from two Supreme Court cases, decided
sixty years apart. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co,'8 decided in 1923,
Rooker asked the Court to declare void a judgment by an Indiana Su-
preme Court because it was "rendered and affirmed in contravention of
the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States and the due
process of law and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 9 Rooker argued before the Federal District Court that the Indiana
Supreme Court applied their own state statute in conflict with the United
States Constitution. 20 The District Court ruled that "the suit was not
within its jurisdiction as defined by Congress" and they, therefore, dis-
missed the case. 21 Rooker appealed to the United States Supreme Court
where the issue was whether a federal plaintiff could bring an action
claiming constitutional error, in a state proceeding to which he was a
party.22 The Court affirmed the District Court's decree, holding that if the
constitutional questions actually arose in the state case, it was the duty of
the state court to decide them; and the state court's decision, whether
13. Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Section 1983, Res
Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1349 (1980).
14. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622 (1989).
15. Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554, 563 (7th Cir. 1986).
16. Benjamin Smith, Texaco Inc., v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a Crude Analysis of the Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine's Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 627, 629 (1987).
17. Id.
18. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
19. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. ld. at 414-15.
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constitutional or not, was an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 23 If the
decision was unconstitutional, this fact does not make the state court's
judgment void, but merely left the decision open for reversal or modifi-
cation in a hearing by the United States Supreme Court.24 The United
States Supreme Court is the only court that can hear an appeal from a
state's highest court, therefore, issues that arise in a state cause of action
cannot be the subject of subsequent litigation in an original federal ac-
tion, but may be heard only on direct appeal to the United States Su-
25preme Court. This holding became the Rooker Doctrine stating that,
"lower federal courts lack appellate jurisdiction to review the judgments
of state courts that have been affirmed by the highest court of the state."
26
The lower federal courts, following this decision, applied the Rooker
Doctrine infrequently, often using the Rooker Doctrine in the same wayS27
they used doctrines of preclusion.
2. The Feldman Decision
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court decided District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,28 which upheld the idea that
Rooker was a doctrine grounded in jurisdiction theories.29 Feldman was a
member of both the Virginia and Maryland bars.30 He tried to be admit-
ted into the District of Columbia Bar under a lighter admission require-
ment allowing for members of bars in other states to be accepted without
taking the bar exam. 31 The Bar Committee in District of Columbia de-
nied Feldman's admission, because Feldman had not graduated from an
32accredited law school. Feldman brought his claim in the District Court
of the District of Columbia,33 asking the Court to grant him admission or
alternatively, allow him to take the bar exam.34 After the District of Co-
lumbia District Court, and later, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, the highest "state" court, denied his request, Feldman filed in fed-
eral court in the United States District Court. Feldman requested an in-
23. Id. at 415.
24. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415.
25. Id at 416.
26. Thompson, supra note 8, 863.
27. For example, in Lavasek v. White, 339 F.2d 861 (1965), the Tenth Circuit found that
plaintiffs claims were barred from federal court because they had been fully litigated in the state
courts. Id. at 863. The Court upheld the District Court that found the claims barred by resjudicata.
Id. at 862. However, the Tenth Circuit found the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, without explaining why they used the different doctrine. Id. at 863.
28. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
29. Thompson, supra note 8, at 871.
30. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 465.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 466.
33. The District Court of the District of Columbia is the equivalent of a state court.
34. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 467.
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junction that required the Bar Committee to either to grant him immedi-
ate admission to the District of Columbia Bar or to allow him to take the
bar exam. 35 Therefore, the issue in Feldman was whether bar admission
decisions made by the highest state court could be challenged on consti-
tutional grounds in federal district court. 36 Feldman went beyond the
scope of Rooker because the issue was whether Feldman may bring his
constitutional questions in federal court, when these issues were inter-
twined with other issues raised in state court.
The Supreme Court held that lower federal courts have no jurisdic-
tion to hear "challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising
out of judicial proceedings . . ."37 or to decide questions "inextricably
intertwined" with state court judgments.38 In other words, Rooker-
Feldman will bar parties from re-litigating in federal court, not only fed-
eral issues actually raised in state court proceedings, but also those inex-
tricably intertwined issues that could have been raised there.39
This decision helped solve one of the unresolved questions left open
in Rooker-- "whether the issues actually must have been raised or liti-
gated in the state proceeding." 40 The Feldman court made it clear that a
plaintiff cannot fail to bring a federal claim in state court in hopes to later
bring that claim in federal court.4' This ruling lead to a new layer of
analysis to the Rooker test-one must decide if the claim is "inextricably
intertwined" with the state court judgment.42 By adding this additional
inquiry, the Feldman court extended the Rooker doctrine from issues that
were actually decided by the state court proceedings, to also include
claims that were not litigated in the state court, and are inextricably in-
tertwined with the merits of the state court. A claim that is inextricably
intertwined has been defined as a claim that is so closely tied to another
litigated claim, so that if a court were to rule on the second claim it
would "effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.
43
Likewise, a claim is not inextricably intertwined with a state court ruling
"if the purpose of a federal action is 'separable from and collateral to' a
state court judgment . [T]he claim is not 'inextricably intertwined'
35. Id. at 468-69.
36. Id. at 463.
37. Id. at 486.
38. Id. at 483 n. 16.
39. Friedman, supra note 5, at 1135.
40. Friedman, supra note 5, at 1134.
41. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n. 16 ("By failing to bring [his/her] claims in state court a
plaintiff may forfeit [his/her] right to obtain review of the state court decision in any federal court.").
42. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16.
43. Fielder v. Credit Accept. Corp., 188 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 1999). The Tenth Circuit
defines inextricably intertwined as, "[i]f adjudication of a claim in federal court would require the
court to determine that a state court judgment was erroneously entered or was void, the claim is
inextricably intertwined with the merits of the state court judgment." Lecates v. Barker, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29306 at 6 (November 16. 2000).
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merely because the action necessitates some consideration of the merits
of the state court judgment. '" 44
The resulting doctrine, arising from these two cases, asks the ques-
tions (1) has the claim or issue been litigated in a state court proceeding,
and (2) is the claim or issue, although not raised in state court, "inextri-
cably intertwined" with a state court judgment. If either of these two
questions can be answered affirmatively, Rooker-Feldman will bar the
suit at the District or Circuit Court level.
B. A Comparison of Rooker-Feldman and Doctrines of Abstention and
Preclusion
The reason why many courts confuse Rooker-Feldman and absten-
tion and preclusion theories is because all three doctrines are very similar
45in substance and procedural uses. All three doctrines overlap one an-
other and may often be used interchangeably. For example, the same
policy reason for Rooker-Feldman, a state appellate process free from
federal interference, may also be a reason for the use of abstention and
preclusion theories. Abstention and preclusion doctrines keep claims and
issues arising out of state court proceedings from being litigated in fed-
46eral court. Thus, they too help facilitate a state court process free from
federal interference. However, there are a few fundamental differences
between Rooker-Feldman and abstention and preclusion doctrines.
1. Abstention Theories Defined
One of the doctrines that Rooker-Feldman may overlap is abstention
47theories. Abstention theories can be defined simply as a federal court's
relinquishment of jurisdiction when necessary to avoid needless conflict
with a state court's administration of its own affairs.48 The abstention
doctrine most closely related to Rooker-Feldman is Younger
abstention.49
44. Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 f3d. 1163, 1170 (1998).
45. Wright, supra note 8, at 4469.1, "The "Rooker- Feldman" doctrine . . . establishes a
nearly redundant limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction. This doctrine is nearly redundant
because most of the actions dismissed for want of jurisdiction also could be resolved by invoking the
claim- or issue-preclusion consequences of state judgments. All of the desirable results achieved by
the jurisdiction theory could be achieved by supplementing preclusion theory with familiar theories
of abstention, comity and equitable restraint."
46. Abstention theories stop federal courts from hearing a case that is still pending in state
court. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Preclusion theories prevent claims or issues
that have already been litigated from being relitigated in another judicial proceeding. See Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
47. See Thompson, supra, note 8, at 898.
48. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
49. This article will strictly address Younger abstention because it involves a federal court's
decision not to interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding. However there are several other
326 [Vol. 78:2
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The Younger abstention doctrine, arose out of the Supreme Court
case, Younger v. Harris.50 Younger involved a defendant who was in-
dicted in a California state court for allegedly violating provisions of the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act. 51 After he was indicted, Harris
filed suit in federal court to enjoin the state court district attorney from
proceeding with the prosecution because the California act violated his
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.52 The lower federal court found
that the California act violated his constitutional rights and enjoined the
state court proceeding.53 However, the Supreme Court reversed stating
that the injunction violated "the national policy forbidding federal courts
to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances. 54 The Younger abstention doctrine, therefore, is a "fed-
eral court's decision not to interfere with an ongoing state criminal pro-
ceeding by issuing an injunction or granting declaratory relief.,
55
Although Younger abstention originally applied only in criminal
cases, it has been expanded to preclude all cases where a party in an ac-
tion may desire the federal court to interfere with an ongoing state pro-
ceeding. 6 Justice Powell described the scope of Younger abstention in
Pennzoil v. Texaco57 stating:
types of abstention theories such as: (1) Burford abstention is a federal court's refusal to review a
state court's decision in cases involving a complex regulatory scheme and sensitive areas of state
concern. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943); (2) Colorado River Abstention is
a federal court's decision to abstain while there are relevant and parallel state-court proceedings
under way. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18
(1976); (3) Pullman abstention is a federal court's decision to abstain in order to give the state courts
an opportunity to settle an underlying state-law question whose resolution may avert the need to
decide a federal constitutional question. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-
500 (1941); and (4) Thibodaux abstention is a federal court's decision to abstain in order to allow
state courts to decide difficult issues of public importance that, if decided by the federal court, could
result in unnecessary friction between state and federal authorities. See Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux. 360 U.S. 25.30 (1959).
50. Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
51. Id. at 38.
52. Id. at 39.
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. at 4 1.
55. See Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
56. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.. 420 U.S. 592 (1975), where the court expanded Younger to
apply to civil cases. Id. at 594. In this case, the court voided a federal injunction against
enforcement of a state judgment that closed a theater as a nuisance for showing obscene films, which
had not been adjudged obscene in prior hearings. Id. at 599. The court held that Younger principles
applied although the state proceeding was civil in nature and a party must use the state appellate
remedies before seeking a federal injunction unless one of the Younger exceptions applies. Id. at
609. The exceptions to Younger are (1) if the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or
is conducted in bad faith; (2)if the challenged statute is flagrantly violative of express constitutional
prohibitions in every clause and paragraph thereof, or (3) if extraordinary circumstances exist.
Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1063-64 (10th Cir. 1995).
57. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
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'This concern mandates application of Younger abstention not only
when the pending state proceedings are criminal, but also when cer-
tain civil proceedings are pending, if the State's interests in the pro-
ceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power
would disregard the comity between the States and the National Gov-
ernment.
58
The broadening of Younger abstention to civil cases makes Rooker-
Feldman's scope very similar to Younger abstention. This is because, in
many cases, Rooker-Feldman plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin the state
proceedings.59
2. Preclusion Theories Defined
Courts have used Rooker-Feldman interchangeably with two preclu-
sion theories. 60 The most common preclusion doctrine, claim preclusion
or res judicata, is defined as prohibiting the same parties from re-
litigating claims 61 that "were or could have been raised in a previous
S~t,,62suit.
'6
The second preclusion theory, issue preclusion or collateral estoppel,
requires a court to uphold an earlier decision by another court on issues
63
that were actually litigated. 64 There are two different types of issue pre-
clusion, (1) between the same parties, and (2) between different parties.
Issue preclusion between the same parties requires that the issue is the
same as in the prior action, actually litigated, essential to the final judg-
ment, and the party against whom the estoppel is enforced was fully rep-
65resented in the action. Issue preclusion between different parties may
be either defensive collateral estoppel or offensive collateral estoppel. In
defensive collateral estoppel, the plaintiff is estopped from litigating an
issue that has already been litigated and a final judgment has been
66reached. 6 In offensive collateral estoppel, the defendant is estopped from
58. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 10.
59. For example, in Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, the defendants argued that Rooker-
Feldman should bar the plaintiffs claims because he was seeking to enjoin a state court adoption
proceeding. Id. at 1390. However, the court found that Younger abstentions should apply. Id.
60. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) ("We have read Rooker not as
a jurisdictional barrier but as an application of res judicata"); Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 425
(2d Cir. 1978) (due process claims that were fully litigated barred by res judicata; Rooker cited as
support).
61. Claims are defined as "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with
respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of transactions, out of which the action arose."
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (2000).
62. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
63. Issue is defined as material points in dispute and essential to the judgment. Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 27 (2000).
64. Tuteur Ass. v. Taubensee Steel & Wire Co., 861 F. Supp. 693, 696 (N. D. I11. 1994).
65. Tutuer, 861 F. Supp. at 696.
66. Bernhard v. Bank of America. 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942).
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litigating an issue that it lost to another plaintiff, and the new plaintiff
wins the issue automatically. Offensive collateral estoppel requires all
the same elements as defensive and that the plaintiffs could have been
easily joined, the defendant had adequate incentive to defend the issue, it
was not a prior inconsistent judgment, and the defendant was not de-
67prived of a procedure advantage in the original action.
Rooker-Feldman's scope is, again, very similar to preclusion theo-
ries. This is because, in many cases, Rooker-Feldman plaintiffs are rais-
ing claims in federal court that are very similar to those raised in the
original state court proceeding. Therefore, courts could very easily apply
preclusion theories, rather than Rooker-Feldman to bar a case.
3. Substantive Comparison of Rooker-Feldman and Abstention and
Preclusion Theories
Many have confused Rooker-Feldman with abstention and preclu-
sion theories in civil procedure because Rooker-Feldman appears to
overlap the two theories. One commentator observes, "[lt]his doctrine is
nearly redundant because most of the actions dismissed for want of juris-
diction also could be resolved by invoking the claim- or issue- preclusion
consequences of the state judgment.",6 In order to understand how
Rooker-Feldman has been confused and may be redundant, a comparison
of these theories will be discussed.
a. Rooker-Feldman and Abstention Theories
Courts have confused and mingled together Rooker-Feldman and
abstention theories, because of their striking similarities. 69 Both doctrines
can bar claims arising in state court from being heard in federal courts.
Younger abstention bars claims in federal court that are pending in state
court.70 Rooker-Feldman bars claims that arose in state courts, or those
that are inextricably intertwined with such claims. 7t An overlap occurs
because all claims that are still pending in state court are inextricably
intertwined with claims brought in federal court if the federal claims ask
the federal court to make a decision regarding the pending state court
claims. If a federal court were to rule on a claim that is still pending in
67. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979).
68. Wright, supra note 8, at § 4469.1.
69. For example in Johnson v. De Grandy even the Supreme Court seemed to label Rooker-
Feldman as another type of abstention theory by stating, "the Federal Government's § 2 challenge
deserved dismissal under this Court's Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine .... " Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005 (1994). The Seventh Circuit recently stated their confusion of the
distinction by stating that rather than attempting "a problematic application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine," the court applied abstention principles and refused to issue an injunction to enjoin a
pending state litigation on the grounds that principles of federalism and comity would be upset.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Moran, 959 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir. 1992).
70. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
71. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16.
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state court, the court would make the lower state court's ruling void.
This is essentially the definition of inextricably intertwined.7 2
This similarity brings up the question, "If an injunction is permissi-
ble under Younger, should the Rooker doctrine cut in to prevent it? [Al-
ternatively,] if an interference is prohibited by Younger... what need is
there for Rooker?" 73 Rooker-Feldman, by barring a federal court's ap-
pellate review of a state court's proceeding, may be superfluous of
Younger abstention when the case is still pending in the state court.
However, there is one fundamental substantive difference between
Rooker-Feldman and abstention theories-Rooker-Feldman may con-
tinue to bar a suit when litigants are seeking relief from a final state court
judgment.74 In this respect, Rooker-Feldman has a purpose that goes be-
yond the scope of abstention. Abstention doctrines only stop a case when
it is pending in state court, while Rooker-Feldman can bar a case that has
reached its final judgment. 75 However, this clear distinction is substan-
tially blurred by similarities between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion
theories.
b. Rooker-Feldman and Preclusion Theories
The similarity between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion theories is,
simply stated, that both doctrines provide a way for the federal court to
refuse to hear a state claim that has reached a final judgment by a state
court. Furthermore, both doctrines require an analysis of whether the
state claims or issues were substantively similar to those bring brought in
federal court. Conversely, the differences between preclusion theories
and Rooker-Feldman are often very difficult to distinguish.
Essentially, the difference between Rooker-Feldman and issue pre-
clusion is simply, that issue preclusion bars only those claims that have
actually been litigated in another court proceeding, while Rooker-
Feldman may bar claims that have not been litigated, but are inextricably
72. The Tenth Circuit defines "inextricably intertwined" claims as "separate to and collateral
to" the merits of the state court judgment. Kiowa Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hoover, 150 F.3d
1163,1170 (1998).
73. H. HART & H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1637 (3d
ed. 1988).
74. Sherry, supra note 1, at 1092-93.
75. For example, the Tenth Circuit in Marrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386 (1996) asked parties
to submit supplemental memoranda advising the court on two questions: "(1) if an adoption order
has been entered in that proceeding, what are the positions of the parties as to whether dismissal of
this federal suit should be ordered under the doctrine of [Rooker-Feldman]; and (2) if the state
adoption proceeding is still pending, whether we should vacate and remand, directing abstention by
the federal district court under the rationale of the [Younger doctrine]. Id. at 1389. This example




intertwined with claims litigated in a previous decision.76 Therefore,
Rooker-Feldman, by barring issues that have not actually been litigated
in a lower court proceeding but were intertwined with the issues litigated,
has a purpose that extends beyond the scope of issue preclusion.
However, many commentators feel that the substantive difference
between Rooker-Feldman and claim preclusion is more complex and
Rooker-Feldman does not bar anything that claim preclusion would not
also bar.7 7 Consequently, many argue that Rooker-Feldman has the exact
scope of claim preclusion.78
The Rooker-Feldman bar extends to claims that were not litigated
but are inextricably intertwined with claims that have been litigated.79
The claim is inextricably intertwined if, by ruling, the federal court
would make the lower state court's ruling void.80 However, claims barred
by claim preclusion arise in the same way. Claim preclusion bars claims
that have been litigated or are virtually identical to those claims that have
been litigated.8 1 This raises the question of whether there is ever a time
when an inextricably intertwined claim arises that can void a state court
judgment, and, at the same time, is not a claim that has risen out of the
same series of connected transactions which claim preclusion would bar.
Many feel that this would never occur.82 However, there are two limited
occasions that arise where Rooker-Feldman has a purpose that extends
beyond the scope of claim preclusion.
One occasions arises when a claim is inextricably intertwined with
another claim and therefore voids the lower state court's ruling, but the
inextricably intertwined claim is not virtually identical to a claim that
was raised in the lower state court proceeding. An example of this arises
in the Tenth Circuit case, Lecates v. Barker. Here the Court found that
the Plaintiffs fraud claim was inextricably intertwined with the lower
state court's default judgment. 84 Plaintiff's fraud claim was not virtually
identical to any of the claims raised in the state court, dealing with attor-
76. Wright, supra note 8. at § 4402.
77. Smith, supra note 16, at 655, stating "Inextricably intertwined claims will only result out
of the same series of connected transactions... [which is barred by claim preclusion].
78. Id.
79. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n. 16.
80. Fielder, 188 F.3d at 1035.
81. Wright, supra note 8, at § 4402.
82. For example, one commentator states, "[IInextricably intertwined claims will only result
out of the same series of connected transactions ... [which is barred by claim preclusion.]" Smith,
supra note 16, at 655. The only way a claim is inextricably intertwined with another is if it is so
similar to the original claim that it would change the lower state court's ruling. However, since this
claim is virtually identical to the original claim, claim preclusion would also bar it and there is no
need for Rooker-Feldman. Id. Therefore, many argue Rooker-Feldman may never bar a claim that
claim preclusion would not also bar.
83. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29306 (2000).
84. Lacates, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS at *6.
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ney misconduct. 85 Therefore, claim preclusion would not bar the claim.
However, the Court still found that if they ruled that the lower state
court's ruling was based on fraud, this would be voiding the state court's
decision. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit found that the suit was barred by
Rooker-Feldman.8 6 Because the two claims, fraud and attorney miscon-
duct, were not virtually identical, claim preclusion could not be used, and
only Rooker-Feldman could bar the fraud claim that was raised in the
federal court.
Another occasion that Rooker-Feldman may fill a gap in preclusion
doctrines involves the question of whether the Feldman court wanted to
preclude jurisdiction "over separate claims that a litigant did not raise in
state court and which are not inextricably intertwined with actually liti-
gated state court claims, where that party procedurally could have pre-
sented the separate claim to the state trial court, but simply chose not to
do so."'87 Therefore, if Rooker-Feldman forbids review of non-
inextricably intertwined claims and all claims or issues that could have
been raised in state court but were not, then Rooker-Feldman will extend
beyond the scope of claim preclusion, which only precludes unlitigated
issues if there is substantial connection between the original claim and
the unlitigated issue.
88
4. Procedural Differences Between Rooker-Feldman and Absten-
tion and Preclusion Theories
In addition to substantive differences, there are procedural differ-
ences in uses and incidents between the use of Rooker-Feldman and ab-
stention and preclusion theories. These procedural differences between
Rooker-Feldman and abstention theories are the same as the differences
between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion theories.
One difference arises because Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine
grounded in jurisdiction theories, and therefore it can be raised by the
federal court as a bar to jurisdiction, anytime during the litigation. Par-
ties cannot waive their right to bring Rooker-Feldman jurisdiction issues
into court by not raising it as an affirmative defense.90 Alternatively,
doctrines of preclusion and abstention can be waived if the defendant
does not plead it as an affirmative defense in the answer.9' Courts have
85. Id. at *4.
86. Id. at *6.
87. Smith, supra note 16, at 655.
88. Id.
89. Wright, supra note 8, at § 4469.1.
90. Id.
91. The Supreme Court has stated that abstention can be waived in Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986). However, the Tenth Circuit
in Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386 (1996), stated, "we are convinced that we have properly raised
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used Rooker-Feldman to raise the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte in
92many cases.
Another difference is that "the preclusive effect a federal court will
give to a state court judgment will vary because under U.S.C. § 1738
preclusion is governed by state rules. 93 Therefore, some worry that
without Rooker-Feldman there will be no uniform application of preclu-
sion rules. While Rooker-Feldman "provides for a limited and uniform
federal law of preclusion in cases that varying state laws may not fore-
close.",
94
However, some scholars feel that these differences between preclu-
sion and abstention theories and Rooker-Feldman still do not provide
Rooker-Feldman with a place in our legal system. For example, Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, in Federal Practice and Procedure take the position
that using the jurisdictional doctrine for cases that involve a form of di-
rect attack on a state court judgment gives little reason for having a sec-
ond doctrine.95 The authors explain why:
[T]he application of federal jurisdiction law rather than state preclu-
sion law may weigh as much against Rooker-Feldman theory as for
it-if state preclusion law permits a second action, and there is fed-
eral subject-matter jurisdiction apart from the Rooker-Feldman the-
ory, it is not immediately clear that the Supreme Court's sole juris-
diction to review a state judgment impliedly defeats the explicit grant
of district court jurisdiction. In the same vein, reliance on a jurisdic-
tional theory may impede a desirable opportunity to decide an easy
merits question rather than a complex preclusion-jurisdiction ques-
tion.
96
Likewise, the second reason for upholding Rooker-Feldman, uni-
form application, has also been thought to be contrary to our legal sys-
tem. Some feel that applying Rooker-Feldman as a uniform rule without
the abstention issue sua sponte." Id. at 1392. Although there is a debate on the issue of whether a
court may raise abstention sua sponte, there is no debate that a court may raise Rooker-Feldman on
its own. Therefore, for the purposes of this article, this remains a procedural difference between
Rooker-Feldman and abstention theories.
92. Jurisdiction raised by the court:
"A challenge under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and may be raised at any time by either party or sue sponte by the court" Moccio v. N.Y.
State Office of Court Admin., 95 F. 3d 195, 198 (1996); "[Tlhis court on its own motion
may raise issue of subject matter jurisdiction." Ritter v. Ross, 992 f.2d 750, 752 (1993);
"At the motions hearing, the district court appropriately sua sponte raised the Rooker-
Feldman issue..." Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 197 n.5 (1997); "A
challenge to a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine 'may be raised at any time by either party or sua sponte by the court."' Doctor's
Assocs. V. Distajo. 107 F.3d 126, 137 (1997).
93. Thompson, supra. note 8, at 912.
94. Currie. supra note 8. at 324.
95. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at § 4469. 1.
96. Id. (citations omitted).
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taking into consideration the preclusion rules of individual states contra-
dicts the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 that "requires federal courts to give
the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments
would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments
emerged."9 A commentator asks, "If the federal court cannot give less
deference to a state court judgment then the state rendering would give it,
why should Rooker-Feldman be used in a way that would require the
federal court to give it greater deference to a state court judgment than
the state rendering would give it?"'98 Applying Rooker-Feldman uni-
formly would deny states the opportunity to decide "the preclusive ef-
fects of their own judgments." 99
Finally, some scholars believe that Rooker-Feldman and claim pre-
clusion overlap completely and that instead of there being two doctrines,
claim preclusion and Rooker-Feldman, each having different "work,"
there is instead only one-a jurisdictional claim preclusion.' ° ° Professor
Chang states, "if the law of the state rendering the judgment would re-
quire the application of claim preclusion, the federal court must apply bar
and merger and dismiss the action even if the issue was not raised by the
parties. ' '
Whether one believes that Rooker-Feldman is a complete overlap of
abstention and preclusion theories or that Rooker-Feldman is adding an
important part to the idea of federalism, the bottom line is that Rooker-
Feldman is alive and well today and used extensively by the lower fed-
eral courts.
C. Application of Rooker-Feldman in Early Tenth Circuit Decisions
The Tenth Circuit has used Rooker-Feldman in many of its deci-
sions. An analysis of their past decisions shows how the Court initially
used the Rooker doctrine interchangeably with claim preclusion or res
judicata. The Court then introduced the concept of "inextricably inter-
twined" claims in Doe v. Pringle, ° 2 cited by the United States Supreme
Court in their Feldman decision. However, the Tenth Circuit has not
always followed its approach advocated in Doe, but has both broadened
and narrowed their definition of what claims that are "inextricably in-
tertwined" with the state court claims.
97. Thompson, supra, note 8, at 913, citing Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,
466 (1982).
98. Thompson, supra, note 8, at 913.
99. Id.
100. Chang, supra note 13, at 1354-55.
101. Thompson, supra, note 8, at 912, citing Chang, supra note 12, at 1355.
102. 550 F.2d 596 (1976).
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1. Lavasek v. White:'0 3 the Court's Application of the Rooker Doc-
trine
In Lavasek, the defendants were landowners that were sued in New
Mexico state courts for a condemnation proceeding.'°4 The State of New
Mexico was converting Highway 66 into a controlled access highway.
°5
The rights of the landowners were fully litigated in the New Mexico state
courts, ending with a final decision by the New Mexico Supreme
Court1 °6 The state supreme court found that the landowners had "suf-
fered no compensable injury for the loss of access or impaired visibility
occasioned by the construction changes under the facts of the case."' 0
7
The appellants filed in the United States District Court, claiming that
they had been deprived of their constitutional rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.'0 8 The District Court denied their claims find-
ing them barred by resjudicata.'0 9 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, however,
it based its decision on the Rooker doctrine and not on res judicata."0
The Court never explained why they did not use preclusion theories.
Rather, it appears that because the parties were trying to raise federal
constitutional issues in federal court that were based on a state court's
decision, the Tenth Circuit used the Rooker doctrine instead of preclu-
sion theories. However, the Court never stated that the District Court was
wrong for using res judicata, but instead seemed to imply that Rooker
and resjudicata can be used interchangeably.
2. Doe v. Pringle:"' the Introduction of Inextricably Intertwined
Claims
Doe brought his claim into federal court after the Colorado Supreme
Court dismissed his application to the Colorado Bar based on a prior
felony conviction. 2 The Colorado Supreme Court found that based on
Doe's prior record he could not be admitted even though he had passed
the bar exam and the state Bar Committee found he was suited to prac-
tice law." 3 Doe filed suit in federal court claiming that his rights ac-
corded by the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment had been violated.' 4 The United States District Court dis-
missed his claim finding that there was a "subtle but fundamental dis-
103. 339 F.2d 861 (1965).




108. Lavasek v. White, 339 F.2d 861, 862 (1965).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 863.
111. 550 P.2d 596 (1976).
112. Doe. 550 P.2d at 579.
113. ld. at 597.
114. Id. at 597.
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tinction between two types of claims which a... bar applicant.., might
bring to federal court: The first is a constitutional challenge to the state's
general rules and regulations governing admission; the second is a claim
based on constitutional or other grounds, that the state has unlawfully
denied a particular applicant admission."" 5 The District Court found that
federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear claims "where review of a
state court's adjudication of a particular application is sought."' 16 The
Tenth Circuit adopted this reasoning and found that the constitutional
challenges were "an attempt by Doe to seek review in inferior federal
courts of the entire state proceedings .. ,, 17 The United States Supreme
Court later adopted this language seven years later which gave birth to
the Feldman part of the Rooker analysis: whether a claim is inextricably
intertwined with a state court decision."
8
3. --acio v. Jones:"9 the Broadening of the Definition of Inextricably
Intertwined
Facio brought his action in federal court after the Utah State Court
had entered a default judgment against him.12 The Federal District Court
found for Facio finding that "the Utah procedural requirement that a
meritorious defense be presented before a default judgment could be set
aside was unconstitutional . . ..,,12, The Tenth Circuit overturned by
finding that Facio was seeking two types of relief: (1) he wants the de-
fault judgment set aside; and (2) he wants the federal court to declare the
122Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unconstitutional. The Court found that
the first relief would require the federal court to reverse the Utah state
court judgment, and therefore it was inextricably intertwined and barred
by Rooker-Feldman.' 23 The Court further found that the second relief
was also barred because it was inextricably intertwined with the first
relief.124 The Court did not look to see whether the second claim was
intertwined with a state claim, but rather found it was intertwined with
the first claim for relief. 25 Therefore, this holding broadened the defini-
tion of inextricably intertwined claims to include not only those relating
to state claims, but also claims inextricably intertwined with claims that
are barred in state courts.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Doe, 550 F.2d at 599.
118. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16.
119. 929 F.2d 541 (1991).
120. Facio. 921) F.2d at 542.
121. Id. at 543.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 541.543.
125. Facio, 929 F.2d at 543-44.
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4. Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover:126 Narrowing the Defini-
tion of Inextricably Intertwined
In Kiowa, Hoover sued the Kiowa Tribe ("Tribe") and six other de-
fendants in state court for a breach of contract claim. 127 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the state courts do have jurisdiction over a Na-
tive American tribe when the contract was entered into outside of the
"Indian Country."'' 2 8 Meanwhile, Aircraft Equipment Company (Aircraft
Equipment) sued the Tribe for a breach of an assumption agreement.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also ruled that state court has jurisdiction
over the claim. The Tribe then filed a § 1983 action in federal court. The
Tribe claimed that Mr. Hoover and Aircraft Equipment, "by bringing
breach of contract actions against the [Tribe] in Oklahoma state court,
and the Judges, by exercising the action, deprived the Tribe of rights,
privileges and immunities secured to the Tribe by the Constitution of the
United States."' 129 The federal district court dismissed the Tribe's suit,
holding that Rooker-Feldman barred the claims. 30 The Tenth Circuit
overturned and held that it should apply a narrow meaning of the defini-
tion of "inextricably intertwined" by finding that a claim is not inextrica-
bly intertwined if it is "separable from and collateral to" a state court
judgment.' 3 ' The Court found that because a court could rule on the §
1983 claim without disturbing the original state action, the District Court
did have jurisdiction over the Tribe's claims.132
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Kiowa, reflects the Court's current
analysis of Rooker-Feldman. The court, although once adopting a broad
definition of "inextricably intertwined," has come to adopt a more nar-
row definition of the test-a claim is inextricably intertwined if it is not
separable from and collateral to a state court judgment. 33 This analysis
also reflects the United States Supreme Courts' interpretation of inextri-
cably intertwined.
134
II. THE PRESENT SCOPE OF ROOKER-FELDMAN
As mentioned previously, direct attacks to state court judgments
have given lower courts many occasions to use Rooker-Feldman to block
126. 150 F.3d 1163 (1998).
127. Kiowa, 150 F.3d at 1166.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1168.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1170.
132. Kiowa, 150 F.3d at 1171.
133. Id. at 1170.
134. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil. 481 U.S. 1
(1987), found that Texaco's federal action was "separate from and collateral to" the merits of the
state-court judgment, and therefore it was not barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 21.
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cases. 135 "Since 1990 alone, lower federal courts have used Rooker-
Feldman to find jurisdiction lacking in more than five hundred cases."'
136
However, many of these rulings have been inconsistent. For example, the
Court wrote that the doctrine is merely a "jurisdictional recasting of pre-
clusion questions."' 137 The Fifth Circuit has merged the two doctrines, by
stating that Rooker-Feldman does not bar an action "when that same
action would be allowed in the state court of the rendering state.,
138
Many courts also go back and forth between the jurisdictional principles
of Rooker-Feldman, preclusion theories, and abstention theories, without
explaining how they are all related.
139
One issue that routinely troubles lower federal courts is whether
Rooker-Feldman bars a suit when it is brought by nonparties. State
judgments are sometimes collaterally attacked in federal court by some-
one who was not a party to the state suit. Under preclusion rules, the
nonparty would rarely be barred, because these preclusion rules only bar
those suits that involve the same parties or and the same issues. 40 How-
ever, the fact that the same issues that were brought in the state court
may now be brought into a federal court by a nonparty troubles some
lower federal courts, which further causes inconsistent decisions. The
lower courts struggle with the issue of how to apply Rooker-Feldman to
suits by nonparties.
A. An Analysis of the Tenth Circuit Case Johnson v. Rodrigues
14 1
The Tenth Circuit has recently struggled with whether to use
Rooker-Feldman to bar an action by a nonparty in federal court. In John-
son v. Rodrigues,142 plaintiff Johnson, the biological father of a baby
placed for adoption, sued the two defendants, Rodrigues, the mother, and
Adoption Center of Choice, in federal court after a Utah state court
granted the adoption of Johnson's daughter without allowing Johnson to
join the proceedings and contest the adoption. 1
43
135. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at § 4469.1 lists the many occasions that it has been used: "to
enjoin, to set aside and void, or to declare unlawful a state judgment. Jurisdiction also has been
denied in actions to compel specific acts by a state court, such as continuance, entry of judgment,
rehearing, or a new trial. A bankruptcy court order to release a prisoner also has run afoul by
Rooker-Feldman. An action to compel restitution of the amount paid on a state judgment, for injury
caused by the judgment, or for damages measured by the amount of the judgment, falls by the same
reasoning (citations omitted).
136. Sherry, supra note 1, at 1088.
137. Cross-Sound Ferry Servs. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
138. Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 1995).
139. McKinnis v. Morgan, 972 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1992).
140. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).
141. 226 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2000).
142. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1103.
143. Id. at 1105.
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Johnson and Rodrigues conceived a child in Arizona and Rodrigues
later informed the father (Johnson) that she had an abortion. 44 Johnson
later learned that Rodrigues did not have an abortion and that he may be
the father of the daughter that Rodrigues had placed for adoption.1 45 Us-
ing a Utah subpoena, Johnson obtained records that made him believe
that there was a pending adoption in Utah for a child that may be his
daughter.' 46 Johnson called the other defendant, Adoption Center of
Choice, and spoke with an employee about the adoption. The employ4ee
indicated that the father could do nothing about the pending adoption.
Johnson argued in Federal District Court that the Utah statutes ap-
plied in this case violated his due process rights by refusing to allow his
participation in the adoption proceeding and thus deprived him of his
fundamental right to have a parent-child relationship. Johnson argued
that the statute was unconstitutional because it did not require the mother
to give the name of the father. 48 Johnson wanted the defendants, to pro-
duce the baby for DNA testing and return the baby to Johnson, if he was
proven the biological father.'
49
The defendants moved for summary judgment. 150 The Federal Dis-
trict Court stated that it was going to dismiss the case because Johnson
did not have subject matter jurisdiction.15 ' The Court believed that John-
son may seek remedy only in the state court for his challenge to the Utah
statute and not in the federal courts where "the relief sought is in the na-
ture of appellate review [of the state court's decision].' 52 The federal
district court stated that Johnson's claims were essentially seeking to
undo the adoption decision of the Utah state court, and therefore his case
"fits squarely within the parameters of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
which prohibits me, a federal district court, from reviewing the state
court judgment."' 153 The lower federal court did not recognize that John-
son was a nonparty to the original proceeding and was not allowed to
bring his claim in the original suit.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the federal district
court's decision, finding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the case in
federal court. 54 The Court accepted Johnson's argument that he was not
seeking appellate review of the state court's decision because he was not
144. Id. at 1106.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1106.
147. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1106.
148. Id. at 1107.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1107.
152. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1107.
153. Id.
154. ld. at 1108.
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a party to the adoption proceeding in Utah.1 55 The Court stated two main
reasons why the district court erred: (1) because Johnson did not have the
opportunity to litigate in federal court; and (2) Johnson was not asking
the Federal District Court to overturn the state court decision.
56
The Tenth Circuit held that if a plaintiff was not a party to the action
in the state court proceeding, then Rooker-Feldman does not apply.
57
The Court continued by stating that Rooker-Feldman does not bar a fed-
eral action when the plaintiff lacked a reasonable opportunity to litigate
claims in state court. 58 The Court did not apply a broad, general rule
providing that any nonparty to the suit would not be barred from federal
court by Rooker-Feldman; but rather the Court looked to the procedural
nature of the case and limited its holding to just those parties who
"lacked a reasonable opportunity to litigate" their claims in the state
courts. 1
59
The Tenth Circuit's second reason for overruling the Federal District
Court is that Johnson's "discrete general challenge to the validity of the
Utah adoption laws must be considered, thus distinguishing this case
from one challenging the merits of a particular state court ruling."'' 60 The
Court found that federal district courts have jurisdiction "over general
challenges .. .which do not require review of a final state court judg-
ment in a particular case.' 16 1 This principle gives the Federal District
Court jurisdiction because the court can decide Johnson's challenge to
the Utah's adoption laws without reviewing a final state court
judgment. 62 In other words, the two claims are not "inextricably inter-
twined." The Court finally relied on, Doe v. Pringle63 which held, "a
federal district court may exercise jurisdiction in relation to review of
alleged federal constitutional due process or equal protection depriva-
tions in the state's adoption and/or administration of general rules and
regulations governing admission."' 64 Thus, the Tenth Circuit found that it
was error to dismiss Johnson's complaint, because his claim did not ap-
peal a particular state court judgment.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1108.
158. Id. at 1109.
159. Id. atI 110.
160. Id. at 1108.
161. Feldman. 460 U.S. at 486.
162. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1108-09.
163. Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d at 596 (10th Cir. 1976).
164. Id. at 599.
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B. Other Circuit Court Decisions Regarding Rooker-Feldman and Non-
Parties
Other Circuit Courts have also addressed the issue decided by the
Tenth Circuit: whether suits by nonparties are barred by Rooker-
Feldman. The other Circuit Courts have rarely used Rooker-Feldman to
bar a suit brought by a nonparty. However, the reasoning why a Circuit
Court decided not to dismiss a case based on Rooker-Feldman has varied
greatly. Reasoning has ranged from applying a broad, general rule, to a
more fact specific analysis that looks at the nature of the case and its
parties.
The Circuit Courts have so rarely applied Rooker-Feidman to bar
suits brought by nonparties, that some Circuit Courts have adopted a
broad, general rule that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to nonparties.
However, this broad rule does not reflect the purpose of Rooker-Feldman
and excludes the limited occasions when Rooker-Feldman has a use that
extends beyond abstention and preclusion theories. Rooker-Feldman, as
discussed above, may have a use beyond the other theories when a party
does not seek to enjoin an ongoing state proceeding, but instead wants to
"jump ship" and litigate in federal court. This purose of Rooker-
Feldman does not depend on the identity of the parties. 1 5 The purpose of
Rooker-Feldman, rather, depends on the nature of the federal suit, and
whether it is an "appellate" review of the state court judgment. There-
fore, it would be incongruous to create a broad, general rule that excludes
nonparty plaintiffs from the effects of Rooker-Feldman.'6 6 Furthermore,
it is not against due process to require a nonparty plaintiff to intervene in
a state court proceeding, as long as "that plaintiff had notice that the state
suit might affect [his or her] interest."'
167
The Tenth Circuit, as discussed above, did not apply Rooker-
Feldman to Johnson v. Rodrigues, involving nonparties.lts However, the
court did not base its decision on a broad rule against applying Rooker-
Feldman to nonparties. 169 The Court, rather, looked to the issues under-lying the federal claim to make the decision. 170
1. The Eleventh and Ninth Circuit Decisions
The Eleventh and Ninth Circuit Courts, like the Tenth Circuit, have
analyzed cases, where Rooker-Feldman's use was at issue, without
making a broad, general rule. For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Dale
165. Sherry, supra note 1, at 1114.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1108.
169. Id. at 1110.
170. Id.
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v. Moore,17 1 held that, "the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies as long as
the party had a reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claims in the
state court proceedings. If the party did not have a reasonable opportu-
nity to raise the claim, then the federal claim was not inextricably inter-
twined with the state court's judgment."'' 72 In Dale v. Moore, the Elev-
enth Circuit precluded the federal district court's exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction finding that the Plaintiff's "ADA claim is inextricably
intertwined with the state's judicial proceedings relating to his bar ad-
mission."' 73 The Court found that since the ADA claim would require the
federal district court to review the facts of the Plaintiffs case, the claim
is inextricably intertwined with the state court case. 174 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit looked at the nature of the suit and resisted making a
broad, over-encompassing rule.
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Marriott International, Inc.
v. Mitsui Trust & Banking Co' 75 also barred a nonparty from relitigating
a claim in federal court using Rooker-Feldman, without using an over-
broad rule. 176 A district court, within the Ninth Circuit, applied Rooker-
Feldman to bar a party who had been denied the right to intervene in a
state court suit, on the ground that the state court's denial, itself, was a
final judgment of the very claim the party was attempting to raise in fed-
eral court. 17 7 The district court, within the Ninth Circuit did not allow the
case to proceed in federal court simply because the federal plaintiff was a
nonparty to the state proceedings. Rather, the Court looked at the nature
of the federal case and applied Rooker-Feldman to bar the case.
2. The Seventh, Third, and Fourth Circuit Decisions
The Seventh, Third, and Fourth Circuit Courts have a general rule
barring the use of Rooker-Feldman to cases involving nonparties to the
original state proceeding. Unlike the Tenth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuit
decisions, these three Circuit Courts do not look to see whether the
plaintiff was given a reasonable opportunity to intervene in the state
court's proceeding or at the nature of the federal suit, to determine if the
federal court is acting in an "appellate" capacity.
For example, the Seventh Circuit in Allen v. Allen 178 relied squarely
on a rule that prohibited applying Rooker-Feldman to nonparties. Allen
involves a woman who gave birth to a child by a man who was not her
171. Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624 (11 th Cir. 1997).
172. Id. at 626.
173. Id. at 627.
174. Id. at 628.
175. 13 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (D. Haw. 1998).
176. Marriott International, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1059.
177. Id. at 1062-63.
178. 48 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995).
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husband. 7 9 She later divorced her husband and the Court gave her now
ex-husband, not the child's biological father, visitation rights.180 The
woman then married the biological father of her child.'18 The biological
father sought an injunction in federal court against the enforcement of
the state visitation order that allowed the woman's ex-husband to visit
the child. 82 The Court may have applied Rooker-Feldman to bar the
case, because the defendant, the biological father, had a reasonable op-
portunity to enjoin the state proceeding and the lower federal court
would have been acting as an appellate court of the state court's ruling. 183
However, the Court did not use Rooker-Feldman, because the Court had
a broad rule banning the use of Rooker-Feldman to cases involving non-
parties. Rather the Court had to rely on the domestic relation exception to
federal jurisdiction to bar the suit from federal court.184
The Third Circuit has also applied a broad, general rule banning the
use of Rooker-Feldman to suits with nonparties. In FOCUS v. Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas,185 the plaintiffs, a citizen's advocacy
group, For Our Children's Ultimate Safety ("FOCUS") and two of
FOCUS' members, challenged a gag order the state judge entered in a
child custody case. The Plaintiffs wanted to talk to one of the parties in
the case and could not. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs tried to intervene and
challenge the gag order, claiming it violated their First Amendment
rights.' 86 The state court refused to hear FOCUS's motion to intervene.
87
The Plaintiffs then filed a U.S.C. § 1983 suit in a federal district court. 88
The Third Circuit ruled that the federal court had jurisdiction because
Rooker-Feldman did not apply to cases with nonparties.' 89 The Court did
not need to apply a broad rule, which might not always be appropriate for
suits by nonparties. Rather, the Court should have looked to whether the
parties had the opportunity to litigate in state court or whether they were
asking the federal district court to hold an "appellate" hearing of the state
court's decision.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit also has not applied Rooker-Feldman in
cases where the federal plaintiff was not a party to the original state ac-
tion. In Republic of Paraguay v. Allen,' 90 Paraguay and its ambassador to
the United States filed suit in federal court, alleging that the State of Vir-
179. Allen, 48 F.3d at 260.
180. Id. at 260.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 260.
183. Id. at 261-62.
184. Allen, 48 F.3d at 261.
185. FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. 75 F.3d 834 (3rd Cir. 1996).
186. Id. at 836.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 837.
189. Id. at 840.
190. 134 F.3d 622 (1998).
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ginia had violated various treaties when it tried and convicted a Para-
guayan national resident in the United States.191 Instead of looking at the
procedural posture of the case and deciding whether the Plaintiffs were
asking the Court to be an "appellate" court, the Fourth Circuit court
bared their action without regard to whether or not they had a reasonable
opportunity to litigate in state court.
19 2
III. ANALYSIS
Rooker-Feldman has caused substantial confusion and, as discussed
above, many commentators feel that it is mostly redundant of other legal
theories. 193 However, the Supreme Court has not abandoned the doctrine
and the lower courts continue to use it to bar cases from federal jurisdic-
tion. Consequently, it is vital for the lower courts to apply Rooker-
Feldman correctly. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Johnson v.
Rodrigues194 reflects a movement by Circuit Courts towards establishing
case law that will help guide legal scholars in understanding the correct
purpose of the doctrine-one that looks at the nature of the federal suit
and not the parties.
Courts should not adopt and apply a broad, over-encompassing rule
that Rooker-Feldman should not be applied to nonparties, because this
rule does not reflect the original intent of the doctrine. Courts using an
all-encompassing rule confuse the already muddled purpose of Rooker-
Feldman. The analysis for Rooker-Feldman only requires courts to look
at whether the parties are asking the federal court to change or alter a
final state court judgment. "A court that strays from this common sense
conclusion will end up hopelessly confused-and will often find some
other reason to avoid jurisdiction."
For example, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Allen v. Allen ap-
peared to confuse the application of its general rule that Rooker-Feldman
is inapplicable to nonparties by not looking at the federal suit itself. In
Allen, the suit is the type of case where most courts have applied Rooker-
Feldman, because the federal plaintiff appears to be trying to undo the
state court's decision. 196 The Court found that the father could have been
a party to the state proceeding if he had followed the correct procedures
for establishing paternity. 97 The Court further found that it would not be
fair to let the father's failing to follow the correct procedures allow him
to litigate in federal court, while someone who followed correct proce-
191. Republic of Paraguay, 134 F.3d at 624.
192. Id. at 627 n.4.
193. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at § 4469.1.
194. Johnson v. Rodrigues, 226 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2000).
195. Sherry, supra note 1, at 1120.
196. Allen, 48 F.3d at 261.
197. Id.
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dures could not. 98 Rather than find that the father was barred from fed-
eral court by Rooker-Feldman, the Court found instead that it was barred
by the domestic relations exception. 99 Instead of looking at the nature of
the federal case and using Rooker-Feldman to bar the case, the Court
further muddled Rooker-Feldman by writing a attenuated decision that
attempts only to justify its own reasoning.
Although some courts still apply an over-encompassing rule, most
courts look at the nature of the suit and apply Rooker-Feldman accord-
ingly. As discussed above, many courts first decide whether a plaintiff
had the opportunity to litigate in state court or if the plaintiff is trying to
change a state court's decision. The Tenth Circuit followed the original
intent of Rooker-Feldman in Johnson v. Rodrigues. The Court looked at
the nature of the federal case, and in doing so, the Court used Rooker-
Feldman as to reach the result originally sought by the Supreme Court-
to extend beyond the scope of abstention and preclusion theories. If all
the Circuit Courts would follow the lead by the Tenth Circuit, Rooker-
Feldman will likely become less confusing. Instead, Rooker-Feldman
would become a worthwhile tool for litigators and court, to use to help
preserve comity and the appropriate amount of federalism of our courts.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Whether Rooker-Feldman is an overlap of claim preclusion or a vital
civil procedure doctrine, the Supreme Court has to date neither nullified
it or abandoned it and the fact remains that Rooker-Feldman is alive and
well today and used extensively by the .lower federal courts. Although,
Rooker-Feldnian has a very limited purpose in our judicial system, it
does have a purpose that extends beyond the scope of abstention and
preclusion theories. Therefore, it is important that it Rooker-Feldman is
clearly understood and properly used.
The Tenth Circuit's decision is a reflection of an analysis that shows
the place that Rooker-Feldman may have in our federal jurisdiction. By
focusing on the nature of the federal suit and not on the parties, the Tenth
Circuit's analysis may help many to understand the real purpose of
Rooker-Feldman. Many of the Circuit Courts are moving in the direction
of the Tenth Circuit. If courts continue to do the proper analysis, and no
longer blend principles of preclusion theories with Rooker-Feldman
principles, Rooker-Feldman may no longer be a confusing doctrine, but
one that is a useful tool in civil procedure.
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